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There is a vigorous debate about the appropriate roles of the state and
federal governments in reducing greenhouse gases and mitigating
climate change.1 There has been little if any discussion, however, about
the appropriate roles of the states and the federal government in adapting
to climate change. Yet significant climate change is unavoidable, and
adaptation will be an important and difficult task. It is not too early to
begin considering how that task should be allocated between levels of
government.
* Sho Sato Professor of Law and Chair, Energy and Resources Group, University of
California, Berkeley
1. See generally Symposium on Federalism and Climate Change: The Role of the
States in a Future Federal Regime, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 673 (2008).
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All levels of government are likely to play some role in mitigation.
State and local governments are in some ways the natural “first
responders” to climate change. They own or license critical infrastructure,
provide health services, and control land use. The federal government,
however, may step in to provide mandatory standards for adaptation
efforts or finance adaptation. These federal efforts may be subject to
certain constitutional constraints that could limit policy responses.
Before adaptation needs become truly acute, we need to think about the
appropriate roles of state and federal governments.
This Article is a first step in mapping this new terrain. Part I provides
a short introduction to climate adaptation. The United States will face
significant climate impacts in the next few decades, and governmental
responses will be required.2 Part II discusses the role of the federal
government in setting adaptation standards, while Part III analyzes the
appropriateness of state versus federal funding for adaptation. States are
likely to play the leading role in funding adaptation and setting
standards, but federal intervention may be warranted by the existence of
interstate spillover effects, political distortions that hinder state responses, or
equity factors. Finally, Part IV considers how constitutional constraints
may limit the federal government’s role. Under present law, those
constraints are mild, but future doctrinal evolution is difficult to predict.
For analytic purposes, this Article will distinguish between mitigation
and adaptation as well as between the federal government’s regulatory
and fiscal roles. But these distinctions are somewhat artificial. As Part I
discusses, the same action can both mitigate future climate change and
assist adaptation to impending climate change. Similarly, standardsetting and federal funding may be combined. We can expect to see
hybrid programs that cross lines between categories.
For instance, consider a federal program that increases recycling and
use of gray water by municipalities. Such a program would serve
adaptation (by helping cities to cope with less reliable water sources)
and mitigation (by reducing energy demands associated with moving
water from water bodies or aquifers to urban users). Such a program
could also combine funding and regulation. One model would be the
Clean Water Act’s treatment of municipal treatment plants. The statute
requires treatment plants to adopt secondary treatment (and more
stringent controls if needed to attain applicable water quality standards)3

2. See JAMES E. NEUMANN & JASON C. PRICE , ADAP TING TO CLIMATE CHANGE :
T HE PUBLIC POLICY RESP ONSE —PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE (2009), http://www.rff.org/rff/
documents/RFF-Rpt-Adaptation-NeumannPrice.pdf.
3. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(B) (2006).
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with some provisions for either modifying the requirements4 or extending
the deadline.5 By 1996, Congress had also appropriated $69 billion to
aid construction of treatment plants.6 Although the Clean Water Act has
been a mixed success in dealing with municipal wastewater treatment,7
its combination of regulation plus funding may appeal to policymakers.
It is easy to imagine expansion of this program to a combination of
mandates and subsidies for recycling water in order to reduce demand
and deal with expected drought conditions.
This is an example of the kind of cooperative federalism that we might
expect to see in responses to climate adaptation.8 Although reality is
less tidy than our analytic categories, we can still gain clarity by drawing
conceptual distinctions between adaptation and mitigation as well as
between regulation and fiscal measures.
I. A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO CLIM ATE ADAPTATION
Adaptation to climate change is unavoidable. The fact is that some
degree of climate change has already begun, and further change is
inevitable.9 This section will survey some of the most likely impacts of
climate change and the sorts of adaptation that may be required.
Climate change will raise sea levels, a simple effect with potentially
far-reaching consequences. Sea level rise will have substantial impacts
4. Id. § 1311(h).
5. Id. § 301(i).
6. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE , CLEAN WATER ACT: A SUMMARY OF THE
LAW 6 (1999), http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/water/h2o-32.cfm.
7. See generally Ellen Wolfgang, Comment, Reclaiming the Clean Water Act: A
New Approach to Wastewater Management, 34 FLA . ST. U. L. REV. 1247 (2007).
8. For a discussion of cooperative federalism, see Holly Doremus & W. M ichael
Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater: Why the Clean Air Act’s Cooperative Federalism
Framework Is Useful for Addressing Global Warming, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 799, 824-29
(2008).
9. M any scientists and policy makers believe that a doubling of CO2 from preindustrial levels to 550 ppm may be unavoidable in the 21st century. This is so because
the world’s political and economic system cannot respond rapidly enough to make faster
changes in some major polluting sources such as gasoline-powered automobiles or coalfired power plants. The lag time of CO2 released from the ocean also contributes to this
problem. Even if all nations could have stabilized emissions in the year 2002, the
concentrations of GHGs would have continued to rise and would approach 500 ppm by
the year 2100. After that, GHG concentrations in the atmosphere would continue to rise
for several hundred years before stabilization would be achieved. Even to stabilize CO2
at 1,000 ppm will require reductions of emissions below current levels. Donald A.
Brown, The U.S. Performance in Achieving its 1992 Earth Summit Global Warming
Commitments, 32 ENVTL . L. REP . 10741, 10741 (2002).
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on the United States such as causing dramatic losses in wetlands.10
Because the slope of coastal areas on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts is
low, a forty-centimeter rise in sea level could result in as much as sixty
meters of beach erosion and may cost billions of dollars.11 A half-meter
sea level rise would place $185 billion of property in jeopardy by 2100,
and the cost of protecting developed areas from a half-meter rise would
be $115 to $274 billion.12 In Dade County alone, approximately $10
billion in property is within 65 centimeters of sea level.13 Thus, sea level
rise translates into significant increases in flood risks.
Water supply is another key climate impact. Flood risk and water
supply issues can be intertwined, as in the California Delta, where
potential levee collapses due to flooding would drastically impair water
supplies for much of the state.14 Meanwhile, in the Southwest, the future
of the water supply is uncertain, with potentially major impacts on
agriculture.15 Recent evidence regarding the Southwest is particularly
worrisome:
Scientists also looked at the prospect of prolonged drought over the next 100
years. They said it is impossible to determine yet whether human activity is
responsible for the drought the Southwestern United States has experienced over the
past decade, but every indication suggests the region will become consistently
drier in the next several decades. Richard Seager, a senior research scientist at
Columbia University’s Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory, said that nearly all
of the 24 computer models the group surveyed project the same climatic
conditions for the North American Southwest, which includes M exico. “If the
models are correct, it will transition in the coming years and decades to a more
arid climate, and that transition is already underway,” Seager said, adding that
such conditions would probably include prolonged droughts lasting more than a
decade.16

10. Denis Culley, Comment, Global Warming, Sea Level Rise and Tort, 8 OCEAN
& COASTAL L.J. 91, 100-01 (2002).
11. See generally David Grossman, Warming UP to a Not-So-Radical Idea: TortBased Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL . L. 1, 12-14. (2003).
12. WILLIAM E. EASTERLING III ET. AL ., COP ING WITH GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE :
T H E R O L E O F A D A P TA TI O N I N TH E U N I TE D STA TE S 14 (2004), http://www.earth
scape.org/l2/ES17424/PEW_Adaptation.pdf.
13. NEUMANN & PRICE , supra note 2, at 17.
14. LOUISE BEDSWORTH & ELLEN HANAK , PREP ARING CALIFORNIA FOR A
CHANGING CLIMATE 8 (2008), http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_1108LBR.pdf.
15. See gener ally J ason M ark, Clim ate Change T hr eatens to D r y U p the
Southwest’s Future, ALTERNET, Oct. 16, 2008, www.alternet.org/story/103366/.
16. Juliet Eilperin, Faster Climate Change Feared: New Report Points to Accelerated
Melting, Longer Drought, WASH . POST, Dec. 25, 2008, at A02, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/24/AR2008122402174_2.html?hpid=
moreheadlines.
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Adaptation of water systems to increased flood and drought risks
includes a variety of responses.17 Some involve management of water
systems through use of longer-range predictions to guide water reservoir
use. Managing water demand is another option, including increased use
of market transfer among users or conservation and efficiency
improvements. It is also important to evaluate the risks to water
infrastructure posed by more severe floods, which may require
investment in strengthening existing dams and levees. Additional
storage capacity (both surface and groundwater) may also be called for.
The challenge of adaptation will be substantial. The Stern Report
estimates that the cost of adapting infrastructure “to a higher-risk future
could be $15–150 billion each year (0.05%–0.5% of GDP), with onethird of the costs borne by the U.S. and one-fifth borne by Japan.”18 The
difficulty of adaptation varies directly with the pace of climate change
and the potential increase in extreme events. “Extreme events such as
floods and drought cause extensive damage to many parts of society, and
thus a critical issue for adaptation is the degree to which frequency,
intensity, and persistence of extreme events change.”19 Simply because
of higher sea levels, higher flood levels would result, with a possibility
that by the end of the century what are now 100-year floods would
become 50-year or 30-year floods.20
Public health impacts of climate change are also a concern.21 By
midcentury, the number of heat wave days in Los Angeles is expected to
at least double over the late twentieth century and quadruple by the end
of the century.22 One of the most vulnerable group (ages over 65) will
double in the United States by 2030.23 Higher ozone levels due to the
increased temperature will cause additional deaths.24 The probability of

17. See generally LEVI D. BREKKE ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE AND WATER RESOURCES
M ANAGEMENT—A FEDERAL PERSP ECTIVE : U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY CIRCULAR 1331, at
29-31 (2008), http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1331/Circ1331.pdf.
18. NICHOLAS STERN , T HE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 417 (2007).
19. EASTERLING III ET AL ., supra note 12, at 17.
20. NEUMANN & PRICE , supra note 2, at 19.
21. See generally BEDSWORTH & HANAK , supra note 14.
22. Id. at 12.
23. J on M . Bailey, T op 10 Rural Iss ues for H ealth Car e Reform , 2 C TR. FOR
RURAL AFF., M ar. 2003, at 3, http://files.cfra.org/pdf/Ten-Rural-Issues-for-Health-CareReform.pdf.
24. Healthy Planet, Healthy People: Global Warming and Public Health, Select
Comm. on Energy Ind. & Global Warming 3 (Apr. 9, 2008) (testimony of Prof. M ark Z.
Jacobson), http://www.stanford.edu/group/efmh/jacobson/OralTest0408.pdf.
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large wildfires is also expected to increase by 12% to 53% by the end of
the century.25
Just as climate impacts are multiple, so are adaptation techniques.
Adaptation covers a wide spectrum of responses:
The array of potential adaptive responses available to human societies is very large,
ranging from purely technological (e.g., sea defenses), through behavioural
(e.g., altered food and recreational choices) to managerial (e.g., alt ered farm
p ract ices), t o p olicy (e.g., p lanning regulations). While most technologies
and strategies are known and developed in some countries, the assessed literature
does not indicate how effective various options are to fully reduce risks, particularly
at higher levels of warming and related impacts, and for vulnerable groups. In
addition, there are formidable environmental, economic, informational, s ocial,
at t itudinal and behavioural barriers t o imp lement at ion of adaptation.26

Few of these measures are costless, and some may turn out to be quite
expensive. It remains to be seen how different levels of government will
participate in this effort.
State and local governments are beginning to understand the need for
adaptation. For instance, Chicago has issued a detailed guide to adaptation
for municipalities.27 The guide considers a broad range of impacts,
including shoreline erosion, invasive species, health threats from heat
waves and increased ozone, damage to key infrastructure, and flood
damage.28
It is important to understand that climate change adaptation and
mitigation can overlap. For instance, green building can be a way of
mitigating climate change through reduced energy use, but it can also
help adapt to climate change through more efficient water use or internal
temperature control. The trend toward green building may push some
regulatory decision making from the local level to the state level,29 and it
is easy to imagine that the federal government might step in to promote
the move to green building. Similarly, water systems are a significant
source of energy use, so water conservation efforts can both respond to
climate change and help mitigate future change.
25. LOUISE BEDSWORTH , AIR QUALITY PLANNING AND CALIFORNIA ’S CHANGING
CLIMATE 6 (Pub. Pol’y Inst. of Cal. ed., 2008), http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/
R_1108LB2R.pdf.
26. M .L. PARRY ET AL ., CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMP ACTS, ADAP TATION AND
VULNERABILITY : CONTRIBUTION OF THE WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT
REP ORT ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 19 (2007), http://www.
ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf
27. CHICAGO CLIMATE ACTION PLAN , CHICAGO AREA CLIMATE CHANGE QUICK
GUIDE : ADAP TING TO THE PHYSICAL IMP ACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (Julia Parzen ed.,
2008), http://www.chicagoclimateaction.org/filebin/pdf/Chicago_Quick_Guide_to_Climate_
Change_Preparation_June_2008.pdf.
28. Id. at 12-13.
29. See Sara C. Bronin, The Quiet Revolution Revived: Sustainable Design, Land
Use Regulation, and the States, 93 M INN . L. REV. 231, 231-33 (2008).
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Some adaptation will happen seamlessly through the private sector or
via low-visibility actions by various levels of government. Other
adaptation efforts will require significant government expenditures or
regulatory initiatives. In the American government system, which
divides authority between the federal government and state governments
and their municipalities, we can confidently predict disputes about who
should take the lead.
II. SETTING ADAPTATION STANDARDS: THE ANALOGY TO
ENVIRONM ENTAL REGULATION
Although the two may be connected in practice, it is useful to
distinguish two federal roles. First, the federal government may leave
adaptation efforts to the states or the private sectors but mandate that
certain standards be met. For instance, it might require that all levees be
adequate even if climate change increases future flooding. Second, the
federal government might itself undertake adaptation projects or fund
projects by states or the private sector. We begin with the first issue in
this section, deferring the other issue until the next section.
It is too early to know what policies the federal government will
embrace regarding adaptation standards or the degree to which the
federal government may be involved. The answer depends in part on
how well state governments perform in meeting the adaptation
challenge. Direct federal regulation is likely to be a last resort.
Standard-setting does not necessarily equate to explicit regulation of
the kind found in federal pollution statutes. The federal government
may use other techniques to set uniform standards, such as, conditioning
state funding on a state’s adoption of federal standards. It may also use
as sources of leverage other federal programs, such as flood insurance,
water supply contracts from federal projects, federal licensing or funding
of infrastructure projects, or conditions on agricultural subsidies.
To get a sense of the range of possibilities, we might consider the
following as a sample of potential areas for new federal standards:
•

Efforts to deal with the increased risk of floods, such as (a)
limitations on infrastructure construction in flood plains or
coastal areas, (b) mandates to relocate some existing infrastructure
inland, or (c) minimum performance standards for levees,
including those owned by state or local governments or
private parties.
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Restrictions on building in areas that will be subject to wildfires
in hotter, dryer conditions.
Measures to deal with the threat of increased drought,
including (a) water allocations between states during drought
periods, (b) multistate or nationwide requirements for water
conservation for irrigation or municipal water systems, or (c)
bans on the production of crops such as rice or cotton in
irrigated areas.
Modification of the Endangered Species Act to require
landowners to preserve habitats not currently used by an
endangered or threatened species, when climate change is
likely to force the species to relocate to that habitat.

In addition, climate impacts might be managed in part through current
federal law. Stricter control of water pollution may be needed to attain
existing water quality standards in order to counter the effects of higher
temperature or decreased flow. Similarly, higher temperatures could
increase ozone levels in cities, requiring stricter pollution controls to
meet air pollution standards that are already on the books. Likewise, the
Endangered Species Act may require actions to maintain minimum
flows during drought periods, which in turn would require water
conservation by other users, and perhaps increased storage facilities.
Thus, although new forms of direct federal regulation may not seem a
strong possibility, at present, there are a variety of other ways in which
federal adaptation standards might emerge. In considering how much of
a role the federal government should play, we can learn from the
existing debate about the federal role in environmental regulation.
Understanding the reasons for a federal role in environmental law may
illuminate arguments for a federal role in adaptation policy.
Why shouldn’t environmental protection be left to the states, as it
generally was until forty years ago when Congress began to enact
modern environmental statutes?30 One reason is that environmental
problems themselves may cut across jurisdictional lines. As Richard
Revesz has pointed out, the economic argument for a coordinated
solution in this situation is undeniable.31 For a similar reason, adaptation
efforts may cross state lines—for example, failure to conserve water in

30. This historical evolution is discussed in Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America
and the Graying of United States Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental
Law’s First Three Decades in the United States, 20 VA . ENVTL . L. REV. 75 (2001).
Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Quality As a National Good in a Federal State, 1997
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 199 (1997) provides a defense of this development.
31. Richard Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144
U. PA . L. REV. 2341, 2387 (1996).
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one state may decrease the amount available to users in another state or
may impair other values of the water body, such as biodiversity.
Such spillover effects are relevant to adaptation issues. When
watersheds cross state lines, flood control efforts in one area may affect
another. In arid areas, failure by water users in one state to conserve
may mean that less water is available for downstream users. The spread
of invasive species due to climate change may also cross state lines, as
do impacts on migratory native species or species whose ranges may be
pushed northward due to climate change. Invasive species that carry
diseases, such as malaria mosquitoes, are a particular concern.32 As
illustrated by Hurricane Katrina, major disasters may also displace large
populations, imposing costs on communities outside their state of origin.
Furthermore, infrastructure that is exposed to climate impacts, such as
highways, railroads, power lines, and pipelines, may suffer service
interruptions that impact businesses and individuals well outside a
state’s borders.
Another type of spillover is economic rather than environmental. In a
world of capital mobility, regulatory efforts may be stymied by capital
flight. In order to attract and retain industry, a jurisdiction may lower its
environmental standards only to spark a round of similar responses from
other jurisdictions. Similarly, in order to attract new business, states
might fail to impose stringent energy or water conservation standards on
buildings, or to keep taxes low, states might neglect infrastructure
projects that would help reduce climate impacts. The result is a race to
the bottom, in which jurisdictions compete by progressively lowering
their environmental standards until they hit rock bottom.33 Only the
intervention of a centralized authority can halt this destructive competition
between jurisdictions. As Revesz explains, under this “race to the
bottom” model, local jurisdictions would face a prisoner’s dilemma so
that federal regulation can be seen “not as an intrusion on the autonomy

32. See, e.g., A my G reer, Victoria N g & D avid F is man, Clim ate Change
and Infectious Diseases in North America: The Road Ahead, 178 CANADIAN M EDICAL
ASSOCIATION JOURNAL 715 (2008).
33. For discussions of the race to the bottom, see DAVID L. SHAP IRO , FEDERALISM:
A D I A L O GUE 42-43, 81-82 (1995); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Inter s tate
Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental
Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992). In the trade context, see Robert E. Hudec,
Differences in National Environmental Standards: The Level-Playing-Field Dimension,
5 M INN . J. GLOBAL T RADE 1 (1996).
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of states, as it is often portrayed, but rather as a mechanism by which
states can improve the welfare of their citizens.”34
Considerable dispute exists among scholars regarding the “race to the
bottom” rationale. Under many conditions, just as competitive markets
for goods can produce efficient results, interstate competition can
produce economically efficient environmental regulation. However,
economic theory suggests four circumstances in which the race to the
bottom may occur, justifying some multijurisdictional solutions.35
First, local governments may be forced to use flawed methods of
taxation, leading to distortions in other regulations in an effort to attract
business. An example might be California’s Proposition 13, which
virtually freezes the property taxes of existing business locations and,
hence, provides a special incentive to obtain tax revenue from new
businesses.36 Another fiscal distortion is that municipalities might
obtain the fiscal benefits of new development without facing costs for
disaster response, which may be borne by higher levels of government.
This would encourage adoption of weak disaster prevention standards.
Second, competition in product or capital markets may be imperfect,
leading to efforts by states to capture firms or monopoly profits, or to
avoid unemployment. For example, because OPEC sets prices above the
competitive level, the oil industry enjoys monopoly profits on oil
because of OPEC’s price-setting activities, increasing the incentive to
engage in potentially harmful activities in coastal areas that may increase
risks from sea level rise or increased storm surges. State governments
may tolerate these risks in return for a share of these firms’ monopoly
profits in the form of taxes or leasing fees.
Third, public choice problems may distort local decisions, leading to
capture of the regulatory process by industry. Real estate developers, for
instance, may have undue influence on land use decisions. This might
lead to excessive development of vulnerable regions, such as low-lying
areas. Political influence by industry could also lead to destruction of
wetlands that buffer storm surges.

34. Revesz, supra note 33, at 1218.
35. See Daniel Farber, Environmental Federalism in a Global Economy, 83 VA . L.
REV. 1283 (1997). For Revesz’s defense of his theory, see Richard L. Revesz, The Race
to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Legislation: A Response to Critics, 82 M INN .
L. REV. 535 (1997). A survey of the relevant economic literature seems to suggest that
the race to the bottom is a genuine possibility though by no means inevitable. See
Bratton & M cCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary
Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO . L.J. 201 (1997).
36. For an explanation of the operation of Proposition 13, see California Tax Reform
Association, Rethinking Proposition 13, http://caltaxreform.org/?p=5 (last visited Nov. 3,
2009).
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Fourth, jurisdictions may be large enough to affect global prices,
leading to protectionist policies. For instance, a country that controls a
major global industry might use a high level of regulation as a way of
providing benefits to local residents while the costs are passed on to
foreign consumers. This factor, however, does not seem particularly
relevant to climate adaptation.
Thus, the race-to-the-bottom question is potentially relevant to climate
adaptation standards. For instance, local jurisdictions that are eager to
attract new development might allow building in flood plains or
encourage unwise development by providing subsidized insurance
against storm or flood damage. When the financial burden of resulting
harms can be shifted to the federal government, such as in the form of
federal disaster relief, states may have a lower incentive to regulate in
order to avoid potential harms than if the state government itself had to
pay for the harm.
Nevertheless, in the context of climate adaptation, spillover effects are
probably a more compelling reason for federal intervention than the race
to the bottom. Other federal intervention may be ancillary to mitigation
efforts—for example, requirements for water conservation in order to
reduce water-related energy usage. In addition, some states may be
lacking in the technical capacity to implement their own adaptation
planning effectively.
No doubt, much of the adaptation effort will be entirely within state
control, but there is a definite argument for some federal role in setting
adaptation standards. No doubt there will also be arguments for federal
funding of adaptation projects as well, a topic considered in the next
section.
III. FINANCING ADAPTATION EFFORTS
Adaptation will not be cheap. In terms of federalism, the question is
how financial responsibility will be divided between the federal
government and the states. Will states finance all or most adaptation, or
will the federal government pick up most of the expense?
A. State Funding Under the “Beneficiary Pays” Principle
It is easy to construct an argument in favor of leaving the financial
responsibility for climate adaptation with the States. Normally, people
have to pay for goods and services if they want to consume them—at
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least, this is the theory of a market economy. When the private market is
unable to produce certain goods, perhaps because of collective action
problems, the government steps in. The basic principle that the cost of
producing goods should be borne by those who benefit from them remains
appealing. On this theory, the individuals who benefit from adaptation
should pay the cost. Usually, this theory would mandate state financing
of adaptation efforts that benefit local citizens.
On an analogous issue in the theory of taxation, Eric Rakowski
suggests that:
[a] nation committed to protecting its citizens as equals will attempt to maintain
it s borders and to supp ly p eop le living t hroughout it s t errit ory w it h
bas ic protection. But it cannot fully equalize protections throughout, at least
not if it t axes all t he s ame, s o t hat thos e w ho choos e t o live in cert ain
areas know that they take on some risks and costs, perhaps including private
protection, as the price of their decisions. Privately purchased protection or the
assumption of additional risk, coupled with equal taxes, is tantamount to equal
protection with unequal tax payments.37

In simpler terms, people who choose to live in riskier areas cannot fairly
demand that their fellow citizens pay to provide them protection from
these risks. We can call this the “Beneficiary Pays” adaptation principle:
beneficiaries of adaptation should pay for adaptation.
The Beneficiary Pays adaptation principle would seem to call for
placing the responsibility for adaptation at the lowest possible
governmental level so that both costs and benefits would be concentrated
on the same group. Thus, coastal measures might be financed by coastal
states, or even better, by coastal counties within those states. Sometimes
an adaptation project’s beneficiaries will not correspond to any existing
political entity. States might respond by creating a special purpose
entity; it is easy to imagine climate change adaptation districts like
today’s drainage or irrigation districts.
Alternatively, states might finance adaptation projects through special
tax assessments on the beneficiaries, just as the owners of property may
have to pay a special assessment to finance sidewalks or other
improvements. For instance, if new varieties of wheat are needed
because of climate change, wheat farmers might pay a special fee to help
develop the new varieties, or if a flood zone needs additional levees,
landowners might pay a special tax.
On one hand, Beneficiary Pays is an appealing adaptation principle in
terms of eliminating moral hazard and rent-seeking. If project
beneficiaries have to pay for projects, they are unlikely to want to
37.
(2000).
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overinvest beyond the project’s benefits or to lobby the government for
projects that will raise their taxes more than any corresponding benefit
they receive. On the other hand, if someone else is paying, localities
may demand unwarranted adaptation efforts either out of an abundance
of caution regarding adaptation needs or simply to bring additional
construction employment to the locality. To the extent that we are
concerned about overinvestment in adaptation, Beneficiary Pays is the
best solution.
However, Beneficiary Pays, as applied to adaptation, does not advance
other possible social goals. It provides little incentive for pollution
emitters to mitigate because the burden of adaptation costs falls on
beneficiaries of projects, who suffer from climate impacts, rather than
the emitters who cause the impacts. (To the extent that areas with high
adaptation costs happen to coincide with areas with large emissions, it
does provide governments a small additional incentive to reduce local
emissions so as to reduce their own future adaptation costs.) It leaves the
costs of climate change where it finds them, doing nothing to advance
loss spreading as a form of social insurance. Furthermore, to the extent
that we view emitters as culpable or unjustly enriched by their failure to
mitigate, Beneficiary Pays does not advance the concept of just desserts.
Finally, because benefits and costs fall on the same individuals,
Beneficiary Pays also fails to serve any redistributive goal, and we may
be concerned that poorer areas of the country will lack the financial or
institutional capacity to manage adaptation.
Whether these are serious shortcomings depends, in part, on whether
these other social goals are viewed as important. It also depends on
whether we have alternative methods to advance those goals. For
example, if we have optimum mitigation requirements, complete
insurance for all risks, and a fiscal system that achieves our desired
income distribution, we do not need to rely on adaptation financing to
help achieve those goals. We may also think that principle of just
desserts is not a valid goal for social policy, or that the circumstances of
climate change do not involve any principle of just deserts. Thus, evaluating
the normative appeal of Beneficiaries Pay may be complicated.
There are also practical issues to be considered. Determining the
beneficiaries of a given adaptation project may be straightforward, thus
limiting transaction costs. Yet this will not always be true. Adaptation
projects may indirectly benefit other sectors of society. For example, a
water storage project may primarily benefit users in the immediate area,

271

FARBER (D O N OT D E LE TE)

2/12/2016 12:41 PM

but it may also offer a potential fallback supply to other users in unusual
drought conditions. This is a particularly significant question with
interstate waters, such as the Colorado River. Adaptation in one area
may prevent local residents from moving elsewhere, which would have
created the need for public services and infrastructure in those locations.
Disputes over how benefits are allocated could become quite heated,
with expert witnesses marshalling the evidence for attributing benefits in
different ways.
Beneficiary P ays clearly supports use of state financing when
beneficiaries of an adaptation measure are in-state. Such a system is
also supported when mitigation incentives, loss spreading, and just
desserts are seen as unimportant or irrelevant, or these other goals are
addressed through different mechanisms. Thus, as a policy matter, much
of the burden of adaptation should be on the state level. However, this
does not mean that the federal government should be completely
uninvolved, as we will see in the next section.
B. Federal Funding and the “Public Pays” Principle
The alternative is for the cost of adaptation to fall on the federal
taxpayer.38 The underlying adaptation principle could be called “public
pays,” which rests on the premise that society as a whole should protect
individuals from certain kinds of harm such as climate change. This
system achieves the maximum amount of loss-spreading, in essence
providing social insurance against the risk of climate change. It
expresses the idea that climate change is a national problem, thus,
emphasizing national solidarity in the face of the threat. To the extent
we are satisfied with the tax system in distributional terms, it also
provides the right distributional result for climate costs.
We can imagine several ways for this principle to be implemented.
The federal government might simply take adaptation as its own
responsibility and pay for projects directly from the Treasury. Alternatively,
state and local governments might receive federal grants to engage in
38. For present purposes, it is irrelevant whether the government finances projects
directly through taxes or by issuing bonds, which will later result in payments financed
through taxes. It would make a difference, however, if imperfections in the bond market
allowed the government to transfer some of the costs away from taxpayers to bondholders.
This might have different loss-spreading and distributional effects than taxation, depending on
the identity of the taxpayers. For example, if the federal government sold all of the bonds to
foreigners and then defaulted, the taxpayers might escape any financial responsibility
(though the government’s credit might be impaired.) On the other hand, if the government
did not default, then adaptation costs would be pushed later in time to fall on the shoulders of
later taxpayers when the bonds are paid off.

272

FARBER (D O N OT D E LE TE)

[VOL . 1: 259, 2009]

2/12/2016 12:41 PM

Climate Adaptation and Federalism
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE AND ENERGY LAW

adaptation, or private sector actors might receive tax credits or other
subsidies.
Although it rates well in terms of loss-spreading, federal funding is
problematic along other dimensions. Particularly, it maximizes the
potential for moral hazard and rent seeking, since localities have an
incentive to seek financial funding above and beyond their true
adaptation needs. In the worst-case scenario, climate adaptation might
become one of the biggest pork barrels in history.
Use of federal funds may be particularly attractive, however, when it
can be used as a mechanism to place adaptation costs on emitters. This
can be justified on the basis of fairness because emitters knowingly
contribute to intensifying an already harmful situation and in the process
may save the costs of emission reduction. Using a carbon tax or
proceeds from auctioning emissions allowances to fund adaptation
redistributes funds from emitters to victims of climate change. Thus,
“federal taxpayer pays” is a potentially plausible basis for reallocating
some adaptation costs to emitters, which could be more easily done at
the federal level.
In short, federal financing of adaptation is appealing when the need
for adaptation is easily monitored (reducing the incentive to rent-seek),
when there is little risk that adaptation will cause undesirable reductions
in self-protective action by beneficiaries, when doing so addresses
wealth inequalities between states, and when the cost can be shifted to
emitters. As with setting adaptation standards, the strongest argument
for federal funding is probably spillover effects. When infrastructure
projects or other adaptation efforts affect multiple states, a federal
financing role is appropriate.
These arguments point toward a real but limited federal role.
Adaptation projects should not be federally funded when there are no
spillover effects across state lines, no obstacles to state provision of the
adaptation, and no strong claim for national solidarity. Still, this leaves
a substantial category of cases in which federal funding is appropriate.
Regardless of these policy arguments, we can probably anticipate a
major federal role in financing adaptation. In 2006, the federal
government spent $76 billion on infrastructure, and over the past
decades federal infrastructure spending has risen about two percent
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annually.39 This is about a quarter of total infrastructure spending.40
There is no reason to think that the federal government will play a
smaller role in infrastructure expenditures due to climate change.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM AND ADAPTATION
So far, we have been concerned with the policy question of what roles
should be played by the states and the federal government. We must
also consider the constitutional question as to what role the federal
government can play.41 Briefly, the federal government can (a) adopt
adaptation standards applicable to private parties; (b) adopt standards to
govern state activities, (c) attempt to mandate that states adopt and
enforce adaptation standards; or (d) place conditions on funding to
obtain compliance with federal standards.
A. Federal Power to Impose Adaptation Standards
State regulations might run afoul of federal preemption or,
conceivably, the dormant commerce clause, although neither issue seems
immediately apparent for state restrictions on land or water use,
construction codes, or other types of state regulatory standards.42 Thus,
constitutional issues with state adaptation standards are not likely to be
pervasive. Some federal adaptation measures, however, might encounter
constitutional challenges.
For instance, the federal government might impose water-use
restrictions on upstream users in the case of a severe drought on an
interstate water body. The users in question might be commercial or
residential. The federal government may also want to protect isolated
wetlands or other habitats to assist species that have suffered from
climate impacts. Such measures might be attacked as exceeding
Congress’s legislative authority under the commerce clause.
The commerce clause gives Congress the power to regulate interstate
and foreign commerce. Until the late nineteenth century, this provision
39. C O N G R E S S I O N A L B U D G E T O F F I C E , T R E N D S I N P U B L I C SP E N D I N G O N
T RANSP ORTATION AND WATER INFRASTRUCTURE , 1956-2004, at 3 (2007).
40. Id.
41. There are also possible constitutional issues about state efforts, but they are
more likely to involve t akings is sues, s uch as t he ability of s t at es and cit ies t o
ban floodplain development.
42. Cooperative efforts between states might also run afoul of the Compact Clause
in the absence of congressional approval, and it is also conceivable that cooperative
agreements between states and Canada or M exico to deal with common problems might
be subject to foreign affairs preemption. For background on the compact clause and
foreign affairs preemption, see Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the
Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 879, 904-10 (2008).
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did not cause much legal perplexity simply because Congress rarely
attempted to use this power.43 With the rise of the modern regulatory
state, all of that changed.44 The cases since the Civil War can be divided
into three periods.
The first period began around 1890 when Congress became active in
regulation and ended abruptly during the New Deal. The Court
vigorously policed federal legislation to ensure that laws were limited to
interstate transactions rather than regulating local matters. Agriculture,
manufacture, and mining were not considered to be “commerce,” nor
were local retail transactions.45 Thus, much of what the federal
government now regulates was considered off limits during this time
period.46
The Court was not absolutist even during this period. Rather, as
discussed below, it was sometimes willing to allow federal regulations
that were directed at noncommercial goals or that reached intrastate
transactions. An understanding of these doctrines is needed to
comprehend later developments. Three major exceptions existed to the
general requirement that the object of regulation be some essentially
interstate aspect of the transaction. First, Congress could close interstate
commerce to noxious items or persons, even if they caused no harm
while actually in transit.47 For instance, it could ban the interstate sale of
lottery tickets even though the actual transportation of the pieces of
paper across state lines was harmless.48 Second, Congress could regulate
local actors or events if they were part of the “stream of commerce.” 49
Thus, when cattle were shipped into a state to be slaughtered, with the
meat being almost immediately shipped out to other states, the local
operations of a slaughterhouse could be regulated.50 Third, Congress

43. DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL ., CASES AND M ATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW :
T HEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION ’S T HIRD CENTURY 839 (4th ed. 2009).
44. Id. (“This changed after the Civil War and the industrialization of the United
States.”).
45. See Hammer v. Dagenhart (The Child Labor Case), 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918)
(citing Del., Lackawanna & W. R.R. Co. v. Yurkonis, 238 U.S. 439 (1915)) (finding no
jurisdiction over labor relations of companies involved in interstate commerce); United
States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 13 (1895) (holding antitrust laws unconstitutional
as applied to national monopoly of sugar manufacturing).
46. See FARBER ET AL ., supra note 43, at 839-50.
47. See id. at 840-41 (interstate and international contagion theory of regulation).
48. Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321, 353 (1903).
49. See FARBER ET AL ., supra note 43, at 843-44.
50. Swift v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398-99 (1905).
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could regulate local transactions that had a sufficient impact on interstate
commerce by preventing state regulators from shifting costs from local
rail shipments to interstate shippers.51 However, these exceptions were
not construed broadly enough to save much of the early New Deal
legislation from the constitutional axe.52
The collision between the Court and the New Deal resulted in the
famous “switch in time that saved nine” of 1937, when the Court reversed
itself under fierce political pressure and began to uphold New Deal
legislation.53 Whether the political pressure directly caused the switch is
debated among modern constitutional historians,54 but within a few
years, Roosevelt’s appointments had transformed the composition of the
Court.55 From 1937 to 1995, the Supreme Court rejected every commerce
clause challenge to federal regulation of the private sector, without
exception.56
Until recently, it was safe to say that the commerce power was
effectively unlimited. Cases such as Hodel v. Indiana gave such a high
degree of deference to Congress that almost any imaginable statute
seemed likely to be upheld.57 For this reason, the Court’s decision in
United States v. Lopez,58 which opened the third period of commerce
clause history, surprised many observers. A majority of the Court in
Lopez departed from almost sixty years of past practice by ruling that
Congress had exceeded its powers under the commerce clause in a
regulation of private activity. Specifically, the Court struck down a
federal statute prohibiting the possession of firearms in the vicinity of
schools.
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the five-Justice majority in
Lopez attempted to limit the commerce power, without overruling any
51. See Houston, E. & W. Ry. v. United States (The Shreveport Rate Case), 234
U.S. 342, 351-55 (1914) (explaining that Congress has authority to prevent a state’s
unreasonable discrimination in shipping rates between intrastate and interstate carriers).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 53 (1936); Carter v. Carter Coal,
298 U.S. 238, 278 (1936); R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 360-61 (1935).
53. The decisive cases were NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937) and United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). For a discussion of the “switch
in time,” see Richard Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The
Hughes Court and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA . L. REV. 1891 (1994).
54. See Daniel A. Farber, Who Killed Lochner?, 90 GEO . L.J. 985, 985-86 (2002).
55. See FARBER ET AL ., supra note 43, at 34.
56. See Katzenbach v. M cClung, 379 U.S. 294, 295 (1964); Heart of Atlanta
M otel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 242-43, 261-62 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111, 113-14, 128-29 (1942); Darby, 312 U.S. at 105, 121-23, 125-26 (1941);
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 22, 25, 30-31, 47, 123, 125-26 (1937).
57. See Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 324 (1981) (“The pertinent inquiry
therefore is not how much commerce is involved but whether Congress could rationally
conclude that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce.”).
58. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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cases or imperiling any well-entrenched federal programs.59 The
opinion begins by invoking the original understanding that federal
powers are “few and defined,” while state powers are “numerous and
indefinite.”60 Rehnquist emphasized that the original function of this
division of powers was to assist in preserving liberty.61 Admittedly, he
added, the scope of federal power had greatly increased in the post-New
Deal era, partly because of “great changes” in the economy and partly
because of a desire to eliminate what were considered “artificial”
restraints on federal power.62 Having analyzed the post-New Deal case
law, however, Rehnquist concluded that the statute limiting possession
of firearms within the vicinity of schools did not fall squarely within the
previously recognized scope of congressional power. He declined to
expand that scope further.63 In reaching this conclusion, he noted that
the statute related to education, which was traditionally a core area of
state concern, that Congress had made no findings at the time about the
effect of the prohibited activity on interstate commerce, and that the
statute required no proof of any nexus between the defendant’s activity
and interstate commerce.64
The Supreme Court has yet to declare any federal environmental
regulation to be outside the scope of Congress’s commerce power,
though it has sometimes found that statutes violated state governmental
immunities.65 Nevertheless, the Court used Lopez as a justification to
read the Clean Water Act narrowly in Solid Waste Agency of Northern
Cook County [SWANCC] v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.66 The
question before the Court was whether SWANCC needed a federal
permit before filling an abandoned gravel pit. Under the statute, federal
jurisdiction covers “navigable waters,” further defined as the “waters of

59. Id.
60. Id. at 552.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 556.
63. Id. at 567-68.
64. Id. at 561-68.
65. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking down federal
regulation of nuclear waste on the ground that it “commandeered” state legislatures into
enforcing federal law).
66. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
531 U.S. 159, 162, 173-74 (2001) (citing Lopez and explaining that the Supreme Court
has held t hat Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause is broad but not
unlimited, then ruling that the Army’s interpretation of the federal regulation in question
was too broad.)
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the United States.” The federal government asserted jurisdiction over
the gravel pit under the Army Corps’ “migratory bird” regulation, which
claimed jurisdiction over intrastate waters that can be used by migratory
birds. The Supreme Court held that the regulation went beyond the
Corps’ statutory authority. The Court expressed considerable doubt
about whether the commerce clause would support the migratory bird
rule and construed the statute to avoid this constitutional doubt. Finding
“nothing approaching a clear statement from Congress,” the Court
rejected what it viewed as a “significant impingement of the States’
traditional and primary power over land and water use.” In the more
recent case of Rapanos v. United States,67 the Court attempted (not very
successfully) to provide guidelines for determining which wetlands fall
within the federal government’s statutory authority but notably failed to
explore potential constitutional concerns.68
There are several areas relevant to adaptation in which the new
federalism decisions may conceivably threaten federal environmental
regulation. The most vulnerable regulations are those that do not
directly address interstate effects or specifically target commercial
activities. For instance, the Safe Drinking Water Act imposes drinking
water standards on public water supplies, which are often provided by
local government.69 To the extent that these activities are considered
noncommercial, Lopez might limit federal regulation.70 The Endangered
Species Act regulates the “taking” of endangered species,71 which
includes some forms of habitat modification.72 It may debatable whether
a particular species has any actual effect on commerce, and the activity

67. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 731-37 (2006). For an analysis of the
contesting worldviews behind the various opinions on the case, see Jonathan Z. Cannon,
Words and Worlds: The Supreme Court in Rapanos and Carabell, 25 VA . ENVTL . L.J.
277, 278 (2007).
68. F or at tempts to sort out the mess, s ee Bradford C. M ank, Im plementing
Rapanos—Will Justice Kennedy’s Significant Nexus Test Provide a Workable Standard
for Lower Courts, Regulators, and Developers?, 40 IND . L. REV. 291, 294-95, 348
(2007); Jon A. M ueller, Adjacent Wetlands: Is Your Nexus Significant? Rapanos v.
United States, 38 ENV’T REP . (BNA) 585 (2007). For an illustrative case, see Friends of
Pinto Creek v. EPA, 504 F.3d 1007, 1011 (10th Cir. 2007).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1 (1996).
70. John Dwyer, The Commerce Clause and the Limits of Congressional Authority
to Regulate the Environment, 25 ENVTL . L. REP . (ENVTL . L. INST.) 10421, 10427-28
(1995). The D.C. Circuit recently rejected a facial attack on the statutory ground that the
SWDA is, at a minimum, constitutional as applied to utilities that sell drinking water
across state lines. See Nebraska v. EPA, 331 F.3d 995, 997, 999 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
71. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1973).
72. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687,
691, 708 (1995) (upholding regulation limiting habitat modificat ions affect ing
endangered species).
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in question may not be commercial.73 The Clean Air Act mandates
reductions in air pollution levels that may require controls on sources
such as leaf-burning, residential fireplaces, personal driving, and
barbeques, as well as pollution from government-owned vehicles and
buildings. 74 Such pollution may or may not have any measurable
interstate effects.
In Gonzalez v. Raich, the Court placed an important limitation on
Lopez by reaffirming that Congress can regulate purely local activities
under certain conditions.75 If they are part of a class of activities that
have a substantial cumulative effect on interstate commerce, where
excluding the local activities from regulation might undermine the
regulation of the interstate market, they can be regulated.76 Justice Scalia
emphasized in a concurring opinion that the regulation in Lopez had not
been part of a larger regulation of economic activity.77 Thus, there
seems to be a solid majority for allowing regulation even of purely
“local” activities as an ancillary part of comprehensive federal
regulation.
To the extent that Congress’s power over adaptation is subject to
constitutional limits, creative responses may be possible. Environmental
trading systems may provide one way to expand the federal
government’s effective reach. Consider the problem of protecting
wetlands from development, which may be particularly important
because of the stress placed on the wetlands inventory by climate
change.78 The government might allow banking of isolated wetlands
(over which it arguably does not have jurisdiction) to be used for
mitigation by developers of other wetlands over which it does have

73. Thus far, the ESA has withstood such constitutional attacks. See, e.g., Rancho
Viejo v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483,
486-87 (4th Cir. 2000) (upholding a regulation that prohibited the taking of red wolves
on private lands). For more discussion on interstate commerce issues and the ESA, see
John Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi-Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 M ICH .
L. REV. 174, 184-87 (1998).
74. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (2006).
75. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005).
76. Id. at 16-17
77. For discussion of the environmental implications of Raich, see Bradford C.
M ank, After Gonzales v. Raich: Is the Endangered Species Act Constitutional Under the
Commerce Clause?, 78 U. COLO . L. REV. 375, 375-76 (2005).
78. See National Association of State Wetlands M anagers, Wetlands Science, http://
www.aswm.org/science/climate_change/climate_change.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2009).
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jurisdiction.79 Such use of isolated wetlands for mitigation would not
exceed the commerce power, for the only actual regulation that takes
place involves non-isolated wetlands over which the government does
have clear jurisdiction. That the owners of such covered wetlands choose
to meet their mitigation obligations through restoration or preservation
of isolated wetlands is not the government’s regulatory mandate.
Arguably, once a banking system is established, the banking system
itself becomes a form of interstate commerce. This justifies federal
regulation because the isolated wetlands are now directly involved in
interstate transactions. This may seem like a form of boot-strapping,
but, in theory, the federal government’s power over commerce should
not depend on whether the market in question is “natural” or created by
government intervention. For example, the market in government bonds
is surely a form of interstate commerce subject to federal regulation.
There is no doubt that the Supreme Court would be quite skeptical if it
appeared that the trading system was established or intrastate actors were
included within the market solely to establish a foothold for the
commerce power. The Supreme Court might be more sympathetic if the
federal market merely subsumed preexisting state markets or if the
inclusion of the intrastate sources took place as the result of private
initiatives.
In the end, the barriers to the federal government’s issuance of
adaptation regulations are more likely to be political than constitutional.
Adaptation involves areas such as water law and land use that have
traditionally, and to a large extent, been left to the states. Federal
incursions on those domains will encounter political resistance, in
addition to whatever threat of judicial resistance may exist.
B. Directly Mandating Action by States
When the federal government regulates private entities, it may also
impose the same requirements on state and local governments. As
discussed in the next paragraph, such regulation of state and local
governments is within Congress’s power—the states have no special
immunity from the kinds of regulations that apply to private actors.
The Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
overruled National League of Cities v. Usery, in which the Court limited
the federal government’s ability to interfere with the integral governmental

79. Some difficult design questions might be posed by such a system in order to
prevent credits for lands that would not have been developed in any event.
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functions of state and local governments.80 Under Garcia, federal
regulation of state activities is valid to the same extent as regulation of
private parties.81 State governments, like private parties, must rely on the
political process to protect themselves against over-extension of federal
power.
Thus, there should be no constitutional issue with federal standards
regarding a wide range of activities. The federal government should be
able to create standards for state levees to the same extent as private
levees, to limit construction of state government structures in flood
plains or other vulnerable areas, or to regulate state-provided or statesubsidized insurance programs.
Regulating the activities of states is one thing; requiring states to
regulate private parties is quite another. In New York v. United States,
the Court held that Congress cannot under any circumstances require
states to pass legislation under threat of sanctions against the state
governments or officer.82 In Printz v. United States, the Court extended
this rule to preclude the federal government from commandeering state
administrative officials to enforce federal legislation.83 These rulings are
at best loosely moored to constitutional text or history, but the Court’s
rulings seem to establish a bright-line, anti-commandeering rule.84
It is important, however, to distinguish commandeering of the state
from regulation of the state. In Reno v. Condon, a statute that prohibited
states from disclosing certain personal information about residents to
third parties without consent was upheld as a valid regulation of the
state, rather than being struck down as a form of commandeering.85 The
Court explained:
Any federal regulation demands compliance. That a State wishing to engage in
such activity must take administrative and sometimes legislative action to comply
with federal standards regulating that activity is a commonplace that presents no
constitutional defect.86

80. Garcia v. San Antonio M etro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985); Nat’l
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
81. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 537, 542-43, 542 n.7.
82. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
83. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907-08 (1997).
84. Id.
85. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 143 (2000).
86. Id. at 150-51.
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Thus, regulation of states is permissible even if compliance is costly and
requires them to take affirmative legislative or administrative action,
provided that the regulation targets the conduct of the state government
rather than requiring the state to regulate private parties.
C. Using Fiscal Powers as Leverage
Flood insurance exemplifies federal use of funding as leverage to
control land use. Flood insurance presents a tricky set of problems. If it
is priced too high, people may simply fail to become insured. If it is
priced too low, society is in effect subsidizing individuals to build in
high-risk areas. Obviously, the solution is to price it “just right,” but
finding the right level may not be easy, especially since there is no
private market to use as a benchmark.87 Insurance that is too inexpensive
compared to actual risks may actually encourage construction in flood
zones. To counter this risk and other development pressures, the
government ties the availability of flood insurance to risk mitigation
measures, such as land use planning.88 This way of using funding to
shape behavior will undoubtedly be attractive to Congress. Other
options for Congress include using subsidies or tax benefits to encourage
climate adaptation or require states to adopt adaptation programs under
threat of losing federal funding.
The Supreme Court has given Congress broad discretion over its uses
of fiscal power. The Tax and Spend Clause provides: “The Congress
shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,
to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States . . . ”89 Congress has often used these powers
not simply for revenue purposes or to finance government programs but
to shape private behavior or state programs.90
87. For a critique of FEM A’s pricing, see GENERAL ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE ,
FLOOD INSURANCE : FEM A’S RATE -SETTING PROCESS WARRANTS ATTENTION (GAO-0912 Dec. 2008), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0912.pdf.
88. See Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance Program
and Louisiana, 60 T UL . L. REV. 61, 64 (1985); see also Federal Emergency M anagement
Agency, Answers to Questions about the NFIP: Floodplain Management (2006),
http://www.fema.gov/business/nfip/fldmanre.shtm (“When a community chooses to join
the NFIP [National Flood Insurance Program], it must require permits for all
development in the SFHA [Special Flood Hazard Area] and ensure that construction
mat erials and methods us ed w ill minimiz e fut ure flood damage. P ermit files
mus t contain documentation to substantiate how buildings were actually constructed. In
return, the Federal Government makes flood insurance available for almost every
building and its contents within the community.”).
89. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
90. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (Congress using
conditions on highway spending to force states to lower drinking age); Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 70 (2006) (Congress uses
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The Supreme Court has made the breadth of the spending power clear.
A century ago, the Court upheld a discriminatory tax on margarine,
clearly intending to disfavor the product.91 Closer to the middle of the
twentieth century, the Court upheld a special tax on bookies, despite the
effect of the tax in deterring the activity.92 The leading case on the
taxing power is now Steward Machinery v. Davis, which upheld the
unemployment compensation provisions of the social security law.93
These provisions established a federal taxing and conditional spending
program to encourage the states to adopt federal unemployment
compensation standards.94 The federal statute imposed a federal payroll
tax on employers, but the employer received a tax credit for any
contributions made to a qualifying state plan. 95 Among other
requirements to qualify for the tax credit, a state plan had to place its
contributions in a federal trust fund. The Court found that these
provisions gave a legitimate inducement for states to participate in the
plan rather than coercing them to do so.96
Thus, it would be appear to be proper for the federal government to
place a tax on construction in flood zones or on conversion of wetlands
to dry land. Similarly, Congress could offer tax credits for landlords
who provide air conditioning to low income tenants, or Congress could
allow faster depreciation rates for investments located in less vulnerable
areas in order to encourage investment in those regions.
The problem of conditions on spending is trickier. South Dakota v.
Dole is the leading modern case recognizing a mild constitutional
constraint on the federal government’s use of conditional grants to
pressure states into adopting federal requirements.97 In Dole, Congress
withheld certain highway funding from any state that allowed eighteenyear-olds to purchase alcohol. The Twenty-Third Amendment, which
repealed prohibition, seems to give states the right to set their own rules
conditions on spending for higher education to force colleges to give access to military
recruiters, despite objections that military’s “don’t ask don’t tell” policy violates campus
anti-discrimination rules governing interviews by employers).
91. M cCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 64 (1904); see United States v. Doremus,
249 U.S. 86, 95 (1919) (upholding a tax on opium that was combined with a special
inspection apparatus).
92. United States v. Kahriger, 210 F.2d 565, 571-72 (3d Cir. 1954).
93. Steward M achinery v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 574-75 (1937).
94. Id. at 574-76.
95. Id. at 574.
96. Id. at 598.
97. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. at 210-11.
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in such matters. Nevertheless, the Court upheld the statute. The Court
rejected the claim that the Constitution forbids the use of the spending
power to accomplish objectives that are otherwise outside of Congress’s
power. The Court found that the drinking age limitation was germane to
the purpose of the highway funding because Congress wanted the funds
to be used to provide safe highways, and underage drinkers present a
higher risk of unsafe driving.98 Thus, in using funding as leverage,
Congress is restricted in its choice of “currency;” the funding has to be
related to the leveraged activity.
The Dole Court also emphasized that only five percent of the state’s
highway funds were at issue, so the statute provided a mild inducement
rather than a coercive threat.99 Thus, Congress could offer the states
financial benefits in order to get them to comply, but it could not make
the stakes too high. In other words, there is a somewhat ill-defined price
control regime in the market for constitutional rights—the federal
government can offer some inducement but not too strong an
inducement.
The germaneness and proportionality requirements—or to put it
another way, the currency and price controls—have serious drawbacks.
First, because these restrictions block exchanges that the parties actually
desire, they are likely to be met by evasion. If states are really willing to
do something in return for receiving money in another program, and if
Congress wants to offer this bargain, it is as difficult to prevent such
deals from being made as it is to prevent any other victimless crime. It
is especially difficult to block these restrictions when the parties have a
long-term or repeat relationship because denying legal enforceability
will not necessarily prevent informal quid pro quos. Second, Dole
entails line-drawing problems about the degree of germaneness and the
scale of the inducement, as well as inviting drafters to phrase the purpose of
the statute in such a way as to connect with spending conditions.
Finally, it seems a bit paternalistic toward state governments to “protect”
them from getting funding in return for agreeing to conditions. Adults
and sovereign governments can normally enter into whatever bargains
they choose, with no one demanding to know if the promise of one party
is germane to the quid pro quo of the other or whether one party is being
offered too large of an inducement. Why should state governments be
treated differently, as if they were underage adolescents or mental
incompetents in need of protection from ill-advised agreements?
Despite these drawbacks, Dole is clearly the law. It offers ample
room for the use of funding conditions to induce states or private parties
98.
99.
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to agree to modify their conduct. Thus, Congress can condition funding
for state infrastructure on compliance with adaptation standards for that
infrastructure or the users of the infrastructure. It can use flooding
insurance or other financial inducements to get cities and states to
restrict development in vulnerable areas. Likewise, it can restrict public
health funding to only those locales that have adequate programs to deal
with heat waves.
V. CONCLUSION
As we saw in Part I, climate change will have major impacts on the
United States, including flood risks and loss of coastal areas from sea
level rise, more severe droughts in some areas, and increases in some
public health risks. These potential impacts will require difficult and
expensive adaptive measures. In a federalist system, different levels of
governments are likely to share responsibility for these responses.
Climate adaptation is likely to elicit a mix of federal and state responses.
State and local governments will do much of the heavy lifting. The
federal government has a role to play, however, where state governments
are ineffective, where there are interstate spillover effects, or where
strong equitable considerations come into play. That federal role may
take the form of creating adaptation requirements that must be met by
state and local governments and the private sector. Alternatively, the
federal government may use its taxing or spending powers to provide
incentives for adaptation. As we saw in the last section, the applicable
constitutional doctrines are complex and may limit some forms of
federal intervention such as federal directives that states regulate private
activities. But the Constitution will restrain the federal government, if at
all, only at the margins.
The future importance of these issues depends in part on what actions
society takes to limit emissions and mitigate climate change. On the one
hand, climate adaptation may be a relatively low-level priority if we
avoid tipping points and rigorously control emissions. On the other
hand, if effective mitigation does not take place and society is faced with
massive climate impacts, adaptation will become one of society’s
highest priorities. In either event, all levels of government will be called
upon to play a role in dealing with the impacts of climate change
Hopefully, mitigation will be swift and effective, making this Article
marginal in importance. But without mitigation, adaptation will loom
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large, and the issues discussed in this Article will shape state and federal
responses to climate change for decades, if not centuries, to come.
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